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Abstract: 
 
 Delays at the border for customs clearance are seemingly a central 
feature of the trade regime in the CIS states.  Here, we argue that with 
queuing costs being endogenously determined in such circumstances tariff 
liberalization (even in the small economy case) can be welfare worsening 
since tariff revenues are replaced by resource using queuing costs.  On the 
other hand, corruption can be welfare improving if queuing costs are 
replaced by resource transferring bribes.  We also show how added 
distortions between perishable and non-perishable, or between light and 
heavy goods can also arise.  We show these outcomes using a simple 
general equilibrium model, and explore the numerical implications using 
Russian data.  The orders of magnitude are both significant and opposite in 
sign to conventional analyses. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In a number of lower income and transitional economies it is common for there to 
be significant delays at the border when achieving customs clearance.  This can be due to 
complex customs formalities, which sometimes are continually changing, capacity 
constraints given limited facilities, and/or corruption at the border.  In some African 
economies, there are reported delays of 3-6 months to achieve customs clearance2, 
although this is perhaps extreme. 
Our paper begins with the observation that if such delays are significant and the 
length of the delay is endogenously determined, then trade liberalization through tariff 
reductions that increases the length of the queue can be welfare worsening.  Tariff 
reductions, as have occurred in the CIS states, thus appear to be bad policy without first 
addressing customs clearance issues.  We show this for small open economy cases in a 
simple general equilibrium model where there is a physical constraint on the volume of 
imports which can be admitted.  We then analyse extensions where corruption occurs, 
and finally where some imports are perishable.  We apply our analysis to data on Russian 
trade for the late 1990s, with the results emphasizing the themes that not only is it best to 
deal with border and administrative delays first before engaging in trade liberalization, 
but also the quantitative orders of magnitudes for the costs involved can be large. 
                                                          
2 See the recent WTO TPRM Report on Togo (1999) p. 30.  
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2. A Model of Trade with Border Delays 
The role and significance of border delays for trade liberalization in a number of 
economies around the world is reflected in anecdotal evidence on their importance in the 
trade of Russia and other former Soviet Union countries.  Hare (2001) in a recent piece 
on trade policy in CIS transition economies says “It is often asserted that inadequate 
physical infrastructure – roads, railways, and the like – inhibits trade, though solid 
evidence for this is lacking.  More often, the real barrier to trade is again institutional, 
taking the form of unreasonable customs delays at many borders in the transition 
economy region, accompanied by widespread demands for bribes to expedite the 
movement of goods.” 
The precise length of these delays and even/or how precisely they arise is 
unfortunately poorly documented in the literature but their impact on trade is 
unquestionable.  There is some suggestion in the literature that continual changes in 
customs legislation and uncertainty as to how they are to be implemented is a key factor.  
Equally, these delays are also thought to reflect the time taken for negotiations between 
officials and importers over valuation, which it is thought can fall dramatically through 
the use of negotiation intermediaries.  Bribes seem to be involved in this process.  These 
and other issues in the Russian case are discussed in Beilock (2002), and Wolf and 
Gurgen (2000).  Delays in the range of weeks or months for clearance are often claimed 
in anecdotes, with six weeks being an approximate mean figure suggested to us for 
Russia in conversations although this varies substantially with the port of entry and 
transportation mode. 
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A Simple Model 
 The purpose of our paper is to focus on the interactions between border delays 
and trade liberalization in light of their seeming importance in these cases.  We formalize 
these interactions in a model of a simple pure exchange economy which is small and a 
taker of prices on world markets and engaged in trade.  For expositional simplicity of 
structure, we assume for now there is no production and all goods are traded (these 
features can be changed in numerical application).  The world prices for the N goods we 
take as given by the wiπ .  Tariff rates ti apply to imports (ti = 0 for exports), and we 
assume the direction of trade is predetermined.3 
In this economy, domestic prices depart from world prices on the import side both 
due to tariffs and queuing costs at the border Tq(π).  For simplicity, we assume these costs 
are the same for all goods, and that units for goods are denominated in comparable 
physical terms (e.g. tons).  Thus, if M goods are imported and (N-M) exported, and the 
direction of trade is unchanged, 
 ( ) ( )πππ qiwidi Tt ++= 1    (i=1………..M). (1) 
Tq is assumed to be indexed and so is homogeneous of degree one in π and is 
endogenously determined. 
 The economy has market demand functions, ( )QRdi ,,πξ , and non-negative 
endowments, wi, for each of the N goods, where πd denotes the N dimensional vector of 
domestic commodity prices.  R defines tariff revenues, and Q represents endogenously 
determined queuing costs (denominated in units of the good being imported).  These 
                                                          
3 This is a standard assumption in most theoretical trade models, although numerically the direction of trade 
can change when trade policies change.  See Abrego, Riezman, and Whalley (2000) for a recent discussion 
of the likelihood of this assumption being false in comparisons between free trade, customs unions, and 
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demand functions are non-negative, continuous, homogeneous of degree zero in πd and 
satisfy Walras Law, i.e., at all price vectors πd 
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i wQRπξπ . (2) 
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For simplicity, border delays are assumed to reflect a constraint on the volume of 
imports that can be processed over the period of time covered by the model (e.g. one 
year).  Thus, for now, we consider this to be a physical constraint rather than one 
reflecting corruption or other considerations.  If C  represents the administratively 
determined capacity constraint on imports, then 
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ξπ  denotes the 
queuing costs. 
In this simple model, if the capacity constraint on imports is binding then queuing 
costs Tq(πw) are determined in equilibrium along with domestic prices dπ , tariff 
revenues, and domestic demands iξ .  The effect of tariff liberalization will be to lower 
tariff revenues and increase queuing costs.  In the case where tariff rates are uniform 
across commodities, tariff reductions simply generate a corresponding increase in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Nash equilibria. 
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queuing costs.  Since the latter use real resources, tariff reducing trade liberalization will 
typically be welfare worsening. 
 
Model Extensions 
This simple model can be extended in a number of ways which capture additional 
mechanisms through which border delays and trade liberalization can interact. 
 
Corruption 
One is the presence of corruption.  This can be modelled simply in this framework 
as the ability of customs officials to extract a bribe for allowing passage of goods.  We 
assume that there is a bound to the bribe, which for simplicity we take to be the ability of 
an official to send the importer to the back of the line in the event a bribe is not paid.  If 
we assume that officials can only do this once, since otherwise they would reveal 
themselves as corrupt officials if they repeat the denial of clearance, this means that the 
bribe that can be extracted by the official is within epsilon of the queuing costs Tq.  For 
simplicity, we take the bribe paid to equal Tq, which will now change relative to the no 
corruption case. 
The discussion above suggests that the queuing costs in the formulation above are 
halved, with bribes making up the remaining difference between world and domestic 
prices for imports.  Thus, if B represents the bribe paid per unit import 
 ( ) BTt qiwidi +++= 1ππ  (5) 
and by construction B=Tq. 
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This also means that in equation (4) the real resource loss from queuing is halved 
and exports increase, since fewer export earnings are needed to cover queuing costs. 
Corruption in this case is thus socially desirable since real resource costs are now 
partially replaced by a transfer of income to government officials. 
 
Perishability 
A further elaboration on the basic model can be used to show how differential 
impacts of queuing on different commodities can result.  One way this can happen is if 
perishable commodities are more adversely affected by queuing than non-perishable 
commodities.  Differential impacts of border delays across commodities are the end result 
with added distortionary costs. 
We can capture this by defining a variable iγ which represents the fraction of goods 
shipped which actually arrive, where 1≤iγ , and ( )iγ−1  is the perish rate for good i.  We 
can then make iγ  a function of the time spent queuing so as to capture the feature that 
perish rates increase with queuing time. 
Thus, for each unit shipped and paid for, only iγ  units actually arrive; or, 
 
( )
i
q
i
w
id
i
Tt
γ
ππ ++= 1  (6) 
and  
 qi Tλγ −= 1  (7) 
where λ is a constant, and so perish rates increase with queuing time. 
With this formulation, differential impacts of queuing by commodity result and 
even uniform tariff liberalization now has differential impacts by good. 
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Other Extensions 
Various other extensions to this basic model can also be made, which for space 
reasons we do not elaborate on in any detail.  We can use a model with production rather 
than a simple pure exchange economy with endowments.  We can also incorporate non 
traded as well as traded goods.  Both of these are standard in numerical general 
equilibrium models of actual economies (see Shoven and Whalley (1992)), although 
neither changes the basic analytical structure in which queuing costs are endogenously 
determined. 
We can also modify the model set out above for cases in which different 
commodities incur different queuing costs per unit weight due to differing administrative 
procedures.  This could arise with valuation procedures being more complex for, say, 
components for electronic products compared to basic commodities such as coal.  This 
can be done by building in different factors of proportionality into the analysis for 
queuing costs for the various quantities imported.  Again, the essential structure of the 
model remains unchanged. 
 8  
 
3. Some Calculations Using Russian Data 
Using this simple framework, we have made some calculations using Russian data 
to explore the possible quantitative orders of magnitude involved with analysis of trade 
liberalization that incorporate border delays.  The delays reported in the Russian case 
appear to be lengthy and a major restraint on trade.  These calculations thus serve to 
underline the point that if tariff reforms occur with no attention being paid first to 
administrative considerations and border delays, liberalization can be welfare worsening 
rather than welfare improving as is usually the case in conventional models rather than 
providing accurate point estimates of actual impacts.  Importantly, they suggest that there 
are costs rather than benefits from trade liberalization in such cases and they can be 
substantial. 
To apply the model set out above to the Russian case, we use CES demand 
functions and in addition specify the model so as to also include both a non-traded goods 
sector and two traded goods so that distortions between perishable and non perishable 
imports can be analysed.  All model variants thus include four goods (an exportable, two 
importables, and a non traded good).   
We use the standard applied general equilibrium modelling approach of calibration 
to a base case data set, followed by counter factual equilibrium analysis (see Shoven and 
Whalley (1992)).  To make our calculations of the impacts of trade liberalization 
incorporating border delays we have constructed a benchmark equilibrium data set for 
Russian trade, consumption, and endowments (taken to equal production) by averaging 
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data for 1997, 1998, and 19994.  These are years during which there was substantial 
variation in Russian trade performance due to the 1998 financial crisis, and using 
averages in this way partially mitigates extremes in any one years data.  We use tariff 
data from World Bank sources for 19995, which suggests an approximate average tariff 
rate across all imports of 10%.  We assume an average border delay of 3 weeks in 
customs clearance (6 weeks is the figure often claimed).  This is the basis for an 
approximate estimate that with non-delay shipping times from Western Europe of 3 days 
and formal transportation cost in the range of 5% (see Hummels (1999) for a recent 
discussion of the size of transportation costs in trade), delay costs could be in the range of 
30% of the value of imports.  We use this estimate as the base case value in our 
computations, making some modifications in the perishability case.  
We use calibration methods and this data to determine both share and elasticity 
parameters in preferences.  For the case of CES preferences, demands are given by 
 ( ) ( )∑
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−
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where αi are CES shares, σ is the substitution elasticity, and income, I, is given by 
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In this case, the import demand elasticity, miη , for import good i is given by 
    ( )( ) ( )ii
i
i
m
i WX
X
S −−−−= σση 1  ( i=1…..N)  (7) 
                                                          
4 Data on trade and consumption are taken from the 2001 World Development Indicators.  Data on 
production by industry (which we use to represent endowments) originates from Goskomstat sources and 
we are thankful to Natalia Tourdyeva for providing it for us. 
5 Data on tariff rates are taken from the 2001 World Development Indicators, published by the World Bank. 
 10  
where Si is the income expenditure share on good i. 
These elasticities are not constant and so direct calibration is not possible.  The 
convention in calibration literature is to use a literature estimate and choose σ so that the 
implied point estimate of the elasticity in the neighbourhood of the benchmark 
equilibrium is literature consistent.  If share parameters on imported goods are large, then 
negative values of σ can result from calibration if import demand elasticities in the 
neighbourhood of one are used.  This is common in general equilibrium trade models, 
since the majority of estimates in the literature are around one (see Erkel-Rousse and 
Mirza (2002)).  Not recognizing the significance of non traded goods can result in this 
problem since expenditure shares on traded goods are smaller in models with non traded 
goods than without them, and is one reason for including them in the model. 
Using GAMS(1996) solution software, we calibrate both the basic model and 
associated variants to the averaged 1997-1999 benchmark data set.  We then evaluate the 
effects of tariff reform for each model variant by computing counterfactual equilibria 
which we also compare to the base case.  We also use a model variant where no border 
delays are present, which we term the conventional case.  In this event, gains from tariff 
liberalization occur. 
We classify the trade data into importables and exportables based on the sign of net 
trade flows by commodity.  We use equation (5) to calibrate model share parameters from 
data on consumption and prices, choosing units for goods in the model such that world 
prices are one.  Equation (5) is used jointly in calibration with equation (6) which 
determines σ given shares, once import price elasticity values are assumed.6  Our 
                                                          
6 We calibrate to the import price elasticity of the first import good, and since share parameters on the two 
imports are similar these two import price elasticities are very close. 
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calibrations yield share and elasticity parameter estimates for the basic model variants for 
assumed values of import price elasticities lying between –1 and –2 (one is the most 
frequently used in empirical trade models) as set out in Table 1. 
Using models parameterized in this way, we have generated two sets of results 
which allow us to analyse the interactions between trade liberalization and border delays.  
In Table 2, we show welfare and trade impacts of liberalization in the basic model with 
border delays and in two model extensions which incorporate corruption and 
perishability.  These estimates are reported for the three values of assumed import price 
elasticities used in calibration in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Calibrated Basic Model Parameters From 1997-1999 Russian Data 
Share Parameters in Preferences Assumed 
Import Price 
Elasticity 
σ  
Generated by 
Calibration 
imported goods exportables non-traded goods 
-1.0 0.314 0.260 0.220 0.068 0.452 
-1.5 0.676 0.276 0.234 0.064 0.426 
-2.0 1.038 0.293 0.248 0.060 0.399 
 
Results in Table 2 show negative welfare effects of trade liberalization measured in 
terms of the Hicksian equivalent variation as a percentage of income in all cases.  These 
costs become larger as the assumed price elasticity rises since as both substitution 
elasticities and share parameters change the evaluation of utility pre and post 
liberalization changes.  Larger impacts on queuing costs across these cases reflect the 
different share parameters generated by calibration.  Costs are smaller in the with 
corruption cases, for high elasticities and larger for smaller elasticities.  The real resource 
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costs from queuing in corruption cases are approximately one half of those in no 
corruption cases, and in that sense corruption is good in the model.  But changes in 
queuing costs are comparable.  Perishability raises costs slightly for all import price 
elasticity cases.  Import volumes only change in the perishability cases. 
 
Table 2 
Impacts of Trade Liberalization in Russia in the Presence  
of Border Delays; models calibrated to averaged 1997-1999 data 
 Basic 
Model with 
border 
delays 
Extended 
Model with 
corruption 
Extended Model with 
perishability 
A.  Import Price Elasticity = -1    
• Welfare gain/loss as Hicksian 
EV as % of income 
-0.130 -0.146 -0.134 
0 0  -0.078(perishable) • Impacts on import volumes 
(%change)    0.017(non perishable) 
• Impacts on export volumes 
(%change) 
0.711 0.920 0.723 
    
B.  Import Price Elasticity = -1.5    
• Welfare gain/loss as Hicksian 
EV as % of income 
-0.248 -0.245 -0.253 
0 0  -0.431(perishable) • Impacts on import volumes 
(%change)    0.095(non perishable) 
• Impacts on export volumes 
(%change) 
1.361 1.550 1.369 
    
C.  Import Price Elasticity = -2    
• Welfare gain/loss as Hicksian 
EV as % of income 
-0.343 -0.310 -0.347 
0 0  -0.989(perishable) • Impacts on import volumes 
(%change)    0.217(non perishable) 
• Impacts on export volumes 
(%change) 
1.887 1.969 1.883 
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The second set of results in Table 3 compares those from the basic model with 
border delays to those from a more conventional model with no border delays.  To make 
this comparison, we use a case for a conventional tariff model where there are no queuing 
costs in the base case, so that in this model relative price effects of tariff liberalization 
come into play as tariffs are eliminated and no queuing costs enter.  In the comparable 
border delay model, the capacity constraint on imports remains.  A tariff equal to the 
combined queuing plus tariff wedge in the base model is applied to the conventional 
model.  We then consider a reduction in this tariff by 10 percentage points.  In both of 
these cases, we use an import price elasticity of minus one in calibration.  As Table 3 
indicates, the signs of welfare effects are reversed between models, and the absolute 
values of effects are different. 
Table 3 
Comparing result of trade liberalization in Russia using a conventional model  
and one incorporating border delays, averaged 1997-1999 data 
 Conventional Model 
(No border delays)  
Basic Model with 
border delays 
Import Price Elasticity = -1   
• Welfare gain/loss as Hicksian 
EV as % of income 
0.044 -0.130 
• Impacts on import volumes 
(%change) 
0.931 0 
• Impacts on export volumes 
(%change) 
0.614 0.711 
 
These simulation results thus clearly show how trade liberalization can be welfare 
worsening in the presence of border delays.  Tariff reductions have little or no impact on 
domestic prices because of the capacity constraint on processing imports.  More queuing 
results in added real resource costs, rather than generating revenues as is true with tariffs.  
 14  
The presence of corruption tends to weaken these effects since lowered tariffs now 
increase transfers to corrupt officials with smaller effects on aggregate incomes.  
Perishability considerations affect the costs of liberalization through more product loss, 
and added queuing results.  And the differences relative to a conventional trade 
liberalization model are in sign. 
In sum, this analysis and the simulations reported point to the significant role that 
border delays can play in influencing the effects of trade liberalization.  Without prior 
attention to administrative procedures and customs clearance, trade liberalization can 
become welfare worsening by increasing queuing costs.  Trade liberalization in CIS states 
that does not first deal with administrative delays can thus be viewed as potentially 
counterproductive. 
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